Chapter Three: Youthful Structures
Figure 3.7
Current Demographic Statistics for Iran8
Population 1980 39 million
Population 2005 70 million
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 89 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 102 million
Median population age 23 years
Population under age 15 29%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 2.04
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 1997) 56%
Unmet need for family planning no data
Life expectancy 69 years male, 72 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.2%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $2,770
Population living below poverty line (2002) 40%
Unemployment rate (2003) 12%
Adult literacy rate (2004) 84% men, 70% women
Arable land (% of total) 10
If the UN's low-fertility variant for 2025 is achieved, and fertility rates decline to 1.4 children per woman, Iran will have a mature age structure, similar to Europe and much of East Asia today. Under the high-fertility scenario, in which fertility increases from its current level to 2.4 children per woman, by 2025 Iran will have moved into the third category, a transitional structure. Despite the range of predictions, Iran is almost certain to make continued rapid progress along the demographic transition in the coming decades.
The Iranian experience suggests that economic growth and transformation to democracy are not necessary prerequisites to fertility decline. Although it has an extremely successful national family planning program and has made more demographic progress than most countries in its region, Iranian politics remain controlled by a small group of hard-line clerics, and economic challenges strain national resources. This mix of a progressive attitude toward family planning and reproductive health combined with other policies that inhibit development is uncommon. Analysts doubt that Ahmadinejad's proposal to reverse demographic changes by limiting women's role in the work force and raising fertility rates is likely to be accepted by the population, given how firmly the national family planning program and the changes it has brought are entrenched within Iranian society.9
Age structure will continue to play a central role in Iran's development in the future. With large age groups from previous high fertility still entering their adolescent and early adult years, it is critical for Iran to maintain its emphasis on universal access to reproductive health care, and implement better coverage for youth, in the coming years. The government should recognize that its demographic progress is paying dividends and use the country's more favorable age structure to address other pressing issues, especially in economics. As Iran learned in 1979, the combination of a population of educated youth with poor employment prospects and the appeal of a fundamentalist ideology can have volatile results.
Figure 3.8
Iran's Potential Age Structures, 2025
Two comparative age structures of Iran in 2025, based on the UN's low- and high-fertility variants, show that even if fertility rates increase significantly from their current level, Iran's age structure is likely to graduate into the transitional category. If fertility rates continue their rapid decline, Iran's age structure will reach the mature category within 20 years.

Summary Point Countries with a youthful age structure have begun the demographic transition, with mortality and fertility rates in decline. However, dependency ratios are still high, and economic growth tends to stall. These countries are more prone to outbreaks of civil conflict than countries with a more balanced age structure, and are less than one-third as likely as countries with a transitional age structure to have fully democratic governance.
Policy Recommendation Further progress along the demographic transition is possible even in countries with political and economic challenges. Policymakers must remain committed to increasing access to family planning and reproductive health services. With more control over fertility, women and couples are better able to participate and contribute to a healthy economy. Countries must improve the status of women by encouraging them to participate in the political process and the economy.
Notes
- World Bank. 2004. World Development Indicators 2005. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators Database. Available
online here;
last
accessed 5 October 2006.
- Greene, M., Z. Rasekh and K. Amen. 2002. In
this Generation: Sexual
& Reproductive Health Policies for a
Youthful World.
Washington, DC: Population Action International.
- United
Nations Population
Division. 2005. World
Population Prospects:
The 2004 Revision. New York: UN
Population Division.
-
Long Range
Analysis Unit.
2006. "Prospects for
Ahmadinejad's
Call for Rapid
Population
Growth in Iran" Long Range Brief.
Washington, DC:
National
Intelligence Council;
Roudi-Fahimi,
F. 2002.
"Iran's
Family Planning
Program: Responding to a
Nation's Needs" Washington, DC:
Population
Reference
Bureau.
- Ibid.
- Tait,
R. 2006. "Ahmadinejad Urges
Iranian
Baby Boom to
Challenge West" The
Guardian, 23
October.
- UN
Development
Programme. 2006.
Human
Development Report
2006. New York:
UN
Development Programme;
UN
Population
Division. 2005. World
Population
Prospects:
The
2004
Revision. New
York: UN
Population
Division; UN
Population
Division.
2006. World Contraceptive Use
2005.
New
York: UN
Population
Division;
World
Bank. 2006. World
Development
Indicators
2006.
Washington, DC: World Bank;
Central
Intelligence
Agency (CIA). 2006. The World
Factbook 2006. Washington,
DC: CIA.
- Long Range Analysis Unit. 2006. "Prospects for Ahmadinejad's Call for Rapid Population Growth in Iran" Long Range Brief. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council.


