Chapter Two: Very Young Age Structures

With generally low levels of development, countries with a very young age structure are consistently the most likely to face major challenges. When countries that experienced new conflict in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were cross-referenced with their age structure at the beginning of each of those decades, very young structures were found to have the strongest correlation with occurrences of civil conflict. In the 1990s, for example, countries with a very young structure were three times more likely to experience conflict than countries with a mature structure. Between 1970 and 1999, 80 percent of all new outbreaks of civil conflicts occurred in countries in which 60 percent or more of the population was under age 30.

The finding that countries with very young populations are more vulnerable to conflict holds true despite the maturation of age structures globally at the end of the twentieth century. This suggests that the vulnerability of countries with a very young population was not merely a result of the large numbers of institutionally weak states in the early stages of industrialization. Although age structures in most countries in East Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America matured significantly over this three-decade period and many countries in these regions moved into more advanced age structures, the likelihood that countries with very young age structures would experience civil conflict actually increased in each decade from the 1970s to the 1990s.

A positive relationship between the proportion of young adults in a population and its vulnerability to conflict has already been established. Other analyses have demonstrated that countries with a youth bulge (proportion of the adult population ages 15 to 29) of 41 percent or greater are at high risk of civil conflict.¹ This correlates with this report's finding that the vast majority of new civil conflicts in recent decades have occurred in countries in which at least 60 percent of the entire population is comprised of youth (ages 0 to 29). Although the 21st century is still young, the eight new outbreaks of civil conflict that occurred between 2000 and 2004 appear to follow the same general pattern around age structure.

Once conflict has broken out in a country, there is little evidence that changes in age structure help restore peace. Persistent and recurring conflicts have occurred in some of the most mature populations in the world in recent years, such as the Basque separatist movement in Spain and ongoing religious and political divisions in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the connections between population age structure and civil instability are most relevant to new outbreaks of conflict. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suspect that the nature of civil conflict may change when recruitment of insurgents becomes difficult, leaving uprisings with isolated criminal elements rather than full-scale revolutions. Such a change could occur when a greater share of young people, particularly men, have decent economic prospects, a development that may be spurred by a shift toward a more mature age structure.

Figure 2.1
Very Young Age Structure Profiles

Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 67 percent or more of total population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately 18-27 percent of total population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 3-6 percent of total population Demographic character Pyramidal shaped; progressively larger bulges in young adults and child portion of the age profile
Population doubling time 20-35 years
Country count (2005) 62
Regional prevalence sub-Saharan Africa
Civil conflict risk 26 percent likely to experience civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 3.6 percent median average GDP annual growth rate, 1970-99
Governance 13 percent likely to have fully democratic governance, 1970-99

Figure 2.2
Outbreaks of Civil Conflict

Countries in which more than 60 percent of the population was under age 30 have been at least four times as likely than countries with more mature population age structures to experience new outbreaks of civil conflict.

Figure 2.3
Risk of Civil Conflict by Age Structure Type

Countries in which more than 60 percent of the population was under age 30 have been at least four times as likely than countries with more mature population age structures to experience new outbreaks of civil conflict.Countries with very young and transitional age structures experienced an almost identical average median GDP growth rate over the entire 30-year period, at 3.6 percent. Countries with very young age structures are generally very poor; their median per capita GDP in 2005 was just $1,800. Historically, rapid rates of GDP growth are common in these countries, especially those with crude natural resources available for export. However, a high percentage growth rate in a country with a tiny per capita national income usually does little in the short term to improve the living situation of the millions of people living in poverty.

Countries in which more than 60 percent of the population was under age 30 have been at least four times as likely than countries with more mature population age structures to experience new outbreaks of civil conflict.When an age profile contains a bulge in a dependent or institutionally demanding component of the population, the government may struggle to properly address its obligations and may fail to meet citizens' expectations. Bulges in the youth cohort of a population (teenagers and those in their twenties) can pose a particular problem if unemployment is high, especially if youth are well-educated and expect financial stability.

Historically, the vast majority - nearly 90 percent - of countries with very young age structures had governments that were autocratic or only partially democratic. Countries with a very young structure were consistently likely to have an autocratic government and, over most of the period surveyed, their median democracy rating was nearly the lowest possible. In the 1990s, this rating improved slightly for countries with a very young structure, but they were still overwhelmingly likely to have an autocratic or partially democratic government.

Figure 2.4
Age Structure Type and GDP Growth ³

Figure 2.5
Governance and Age Structure Type